

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI  
EASTERN DIVISION**

NATHANIEL SIMMONS,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	No. 4:18-CV-531 ACL
	)	
THOMAS GABEL, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of plaintiff Nathaniel Simmons, an inmate at Fulton Reception and Diagnostic Center, for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial filing fee of \$.10. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, based upon a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

**28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these

monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds \$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. *Id.*

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly balance of \$2.80. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of \$.10, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly balance.

#### **28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action is malicious when it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing litigants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. *Spencer v. Rhodes*, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), *aff=d* 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987).

To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include “legal conclusions” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements.” *Id.* at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. *Id.* at 1950-51. This is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” *Id.* at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the “mere possibility of misconduct.” *Id.* The Court must review the factual

allegations in the complaint “to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” *Id.* at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff’s proffered conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. *Id.* at 1950, 1951-52.

### **The Complaint**

Plaintiff, an inmate at Fulton Reception and Diagnostic Center brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his civil rights. Plaintiff has named as defendants in this action his public defender, Thomas Gabel, and the Judge in his criminal case, John C. Brackman.

Plaintiff asserts that he was misinformed by his public defender, defendant Gabel, as to what his criminal sentence would possibly be for pleading guilty to the crime of Driving While Intoxicated as a persistent offender. Plaintiff believes he did not receive effective assistance from his public defender, and he claims that Judge Brackman did not adequately review the circumstances and evidence when making a decision as to his sentence.

Plaintiff asserts that he served a year and a half imprisonment on his sentence, and he claims that he “had the case vacated in August of 2009.” He claims he “had the case dismissed (twice),” but he has continuously been re-prosecuted on the same crime. Plaintiff asserts that he has lost his marriage and custody of his children as a result of his legal issues.

Plaintiff seeks financial remuneration, in addition to injunctive relief.<sup>1</sup>

### **Discussion**

Unfortunately, plaintiff is not entitled to relief in this action. Plaintiff’s complaint is legally frivolous as to Judge Brackman because judges are “entitled to absolute immunity for all judicial actions that are not ‘taken in a complete absence of all jurisdiction.’” *Penn v. United*

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<sup>1</sup>Plaintiff asks that the “Interlock Stipulation” be removed from his driver’s license reinstatement requirements.

*States*, 335 F.3d 786, 789 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)).

Furthermore, plaintiff's claims against defendant Gabel are also subject to dismissal.

A § 1983 claim must allege that a defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; *Neitzke*, 490 U.S. at 325. A public defender does not act under color of state law while representing a plaintiff in a criminal proceeding. *Polk County v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981). In light of the aforementioned, plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed.

Accordingly,

**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 2] is **GRANTED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of \$.10 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that this action is **DISMISSED** pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that all pending motions are **DENIED AS MOOT**.

An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 19<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2018.



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STEPHEN N. LIMBAUGH, JR.  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE